Editorial: Military 'intelligence'?
The news from the Senate Armed Services Committee last week was the revelation by Gen. Lloyd Austin, head of Central Command overseeing U.S. military activities in the Middle East, that only "four or five" Syrians remained out of the first 54 trained by the Army to join Syrian forces fighting Bashar Assad's regime.
Such a confession deservedly commanded the headlines. We regret, however, that another possibly related topic could not be explored. Austin declined comment on the Army inspector general's probe into allegations (reported by The New York Times) that many analysts in the intelligence section of the command had complained that their reports were edited by superiors to show more "progress" against the Islamic State than was justified.
Little else is known yet. Even if the allegations are only partly true, such duplicity could explain some of the Obama administration's ineptitude.
Military intelligence such as photographic surveillance forms only one thread in the blanket of reasons that produce assessments and decisions. Work of the CIA, friendly foreign intelligence agencies, State Department diplomats, eavesdropping by the National Security Agency, and other sources add pieces to the puzzle.
Working against the duty of producing copper-plated truth is an attitude, common in all militaries, of "can do." Once a commander has projected that spirit to civilian leadership, it can be hard for him - or her - to admit contrary truth.
The Pentagon was misled for much of the Vietnam War by body counts allegedly showing severe damage to enemy forces when many bodies were civilian. The Royal Air Force overestimated the damage it was doing to its German foe in the Battle of Britain in 1940, and would have done better to have just counted the German pilots (living and dead) who crashed in Britain.
Civilian leadership must understand such a culture and how to neutralize it - a duty apparently neglected, like so many others, by the Obama administration.
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