Caliphate of Fear
The Curse of the Islamic State
By SPIEGEL Staff
In Raqqa, Syria, the Islamic State's "caliphate" has already become a reality. All women in the city are required to wear the niqab veil and pants are banned. Thieves have their hands hacked off and opponents are publicly crucified or beheaded, with the images of these horrific acts then posted on social networks.
The few hair salons that are still open are required to black out the pictures of women on the packaging for hair dye solutions. Weddings are only permitted to take place without music. And at livestock markets, the hindquarters of goats and sheep must be covered in order to prevent men from viewing their genitalia and having uncomely thoughts.
Any person caught out on the street during the five daily prayer times is risking his or her life.
The jihadists with the Islamic State, or IS, are acting out their fantasies of omnipotence in the name of God. They're murdering, torturing and forcing families to give their daughters away for marriage to Islamist fighters coming in from abroad. One girl whose family agreed to marry her off took her own life.
Pictures were needed in order for the international community to understand the scale of the horror unfolding in Iraq and just how inhumanely the Islamic State terrorist militia is acting. Images allowed the global community to become witnesses to the plight of the Yazidis, followers of one of the world's most obscure religions, as they were forced to flee into the mountains, begging for help as they died of thirst. In the eyes of the IS fanatics, the Yazidis are "devil worshippers," people who deserve to die.
It was only this threat of genocide that moved the global community to act. Countries around the world quickly united in the battle against IS, by far the world's most brutal, most successful -- and most sinister -- jihadist troop.
In recent weeks, IS fighters managed to drive out the peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Autonomous Government of Iraq with disturbing ease. In some cases the Kurdish soldiers, previously considered the best Iraq has to offer, didn't even resist. The IS threat has even brought rapprochement between the peshmerga and the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), who had long been enemies.
A Common Enemy for the US and Iran
Further afield, the United States and Iran have likewise found a common enemy in the Islamic State. And within just a few weeks time, countries in the West have proven capable decisions that would have been inconceivable not long ago. European countries, for example, now want to deliver weapons to the Kurds, seeing them as the only reliable allies in the region. Meanwhile, the US, which withdrew its troops from Iraq just two years ago, saw no alternative to intervening in the new conflict with special forces and fighter jets.
Little could do more to underscore the failure of America's Iraq adventure than the bombing of US weapons systems by US fighter planes in northern Iraq in recent weeks. They also had to eliminate armored vehicles and mobile artillery units that they had once delivered to the Iraqi army -- and which fell into the hands of the Islamic State in June.
But the IS isn't just brutal, it is also sophisticated. Until the peshmerga regained the territory late last week, IS even temporarily had control of the Mosul dam, the largest rivers and, with them, large parts of Iraq's supplies of drinking water. And it still controls large stocks of wheat and important agricultural areas.
The Greatest Terrorist Threat Since al-Qaida
And so it is that the caliphate of the Islamic State suddenly appeared on the maps, a nightmarish realm that stretches from northeastern Syria deep into Iraq, led by a self-appointed caliph named Abu Baqr al-Baghdadi.
How could it have come to this?
In the past few years, the greatest terrorist threat since al-Qaida has slowly emerged. But the development was not unavoidable. There are two significant contributing factors that have allowed large parts of Iraq and Syria to descend into jihadist territory. One is the civil war in Syria, which enabled fighters from Iraq and the rest of the world to gain experience in war, it helped them find donors and it gave them a cause to fight for. The international community's delayed reaction in responding to the Syrian conflict also played a role.
But the origins of IS go back to the Iraqi civil war in the period that followed the US invasion in 2003. There's no way the organization could have grown as fast as it did without support from Iraqi Sunnis. For years, they were shunted aside by the government of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and many are still caught up in the nostalgic resentment of having lost the earlier supremacy in society they enjoyed during the era of Saddam Hussein, himself a Sunni.
After resisting the move bitterly, Maliki finally resigned from office last week. His designated successor, Haidar al-Abadi, is also a Shiite. Leaders of the country's Sunni tribes declared last week they would be willing to negotiate with him. Indeed, an understanding between the Shiites and Sunnis would be decisive in any effort to drive back the Islamic State. Still, that alone will not be enough.
"Unfortunately, the IS has been allowed to grow and develop to such an extent that any strategy to really counter it will have to take years and very significant resources," says Charles Lister of the Brookings Institution, who researches the group intensively in the Doha, Qatar office of the Washington-based think tank. He argues that military measures won't suffice for the task.
IS has an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 fighters in Syria and, with allied militias, more than 15,000 in Iraq, though such figures are imprecise. Those fighters include some 2,000 to 3,000 fighters believed to be of European origin.
When it conquered Mosul, IS gained access to almost a half-billion dollars in cash, making them independent of donations from Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the organization sells oil and gas from fields it has conquered, it controls water and electricity and it collects taxes.
IS even offers social security benefits to residents of areas under its control -- just like a real country, says Brookings' Lister. Whatever regions the IS captures, it simply continues paying local workers -- people like the employees at the Mosul dam or even those working in restaurants.
A Fanaticized World
But how are things looking inside the Islamic State? For three weeks, the journalist Medyan Dairieh was allowed to stay in Raqqa, the capital city of the caliphate. IS fighters themselves determined what he was allowed to see and what he was allowed to film. The result is a 45-minute film that sometimes seems like propaganda but which nevertheless provides the first real view of life inside the caliphate. It shows a world of fanatical people in which adolescents shout into the camera, declaring war on infidels.
The Islamic State even has a spokesman in Raqqa -- Abu Musa, a young man with a beard who has a penchant for wearing Ray Ban sunglasses. He uses his position to send a message to America, saying things like: "Don't be cowards who attack us with drones. Send your soldiers instead, the ones we already humiliated in Iraq."
Also visible in the video is a patrol of the Hisbah, the Islamic State's morals police. "Just try to find a person who is selling alcohol," boasts the head of the patrol. While driving by, he warns the husband of a fully veiled woman that she shouldn't lift her gown at all while walking.
The history of the organization that would later become IS began before the US invasion in Iraq. In the subsequent years, a Jordanian calling himself Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, began conducting a series of spectacular bombing attacks against Shiites in his effort to provoke a religious war.
Zarqawi officially closed ranks with al-Qaida. Before he was killed, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden even criticized the brutality of the terrorist group's Iraqi offshoot in a document that would emerge later. Even back then, Zarqawi's men unsettled their Sunni allies with absurd rules. These included, for example, bans on ice cream, which didn't even exist during the Prophet Muhammad's life, or the sale of cucumbers at markets because they could encourage prurient thoughts.
Before he was killed in a US air strike in 2006, Zarqawi fomented a civil war that still threatens to tear Iraq apart today. After his death, the organization renamed itself as the Islamic State in Iraq and lost much of its punch after the Americans began to form coalitions with Sunni tribes.
The Region's Strongest Militia
It was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the organization since 2010, who transformed IS into what it is today. IS expert Lister says he has introduced a more professional and methodical military approach, adding that Baghdadi adopted much of Zarqawi's approach but doubled its effectiveness. He also says that Baghdadi possesses a higher level of authority because, in contrast to men like bin Laden, he also has a religious education, with a PhD in Islamic Theology.
Still, he apparently doesn't control his military himself, instead relying on a leadership circle comprised largely of former officers and ex-officials from Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. They are kept sealed off from day to day IS operations with fighters in the field only know their local "emir," who in turn only has ties to his provincial emir.
Observers today consider IS to be the region's strongest militia. But it took years for it to secure that position, a process that led from the beginnings of the Iraq war through the civil war in Syria almost a decade later.
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